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The World Conservation Strategy 
As A Dystopian Vision 
The World Conservation Strategy (WCS) was 
published in 1980 by the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), the United Nations En-
vironmental Programme (UNEP), the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESC0).1 Its mandate 
was to establish a universal understanding of 
environmental problems and to secure the 
acceptance of planetary management goals. In 
the face of massive desertification, 
deforestation, the erosion of soils, the pollution 
of freshwater supplies, the extinction of species 
and many other ecological disasters, it seemed 
prudent to have one overall strategy for dealing 
with environmental ills. The authors of the 
WCS agreed that non-human resources had to be 
identified and protected in order to secure the 
integrity of ecosystems as well as our own 
future. 
The question of the value of the WCS is 
debated by those who want to protect wild 
nature (preservationists) and those who want to 
manage it (conservationists), that is, by those 
who reject the industrial growth ethos and its 
conservation/development imperatives and those 
who want to remain on the path that industrial 
society is following. The approach that the WCS 
takes toward nature is clearly not new. In fact, 
its philosophical roots appear to extend deep 
into the history of Western thought where it 
finds its place in a tradition of utopian 
speculation that asserts the dichotomy between 
reason and emotion. 
In this paper I will examine the WCS as 
expressive of that utopian tradition, a tradition 
which only helps, in the end, to do the bidding 
of the industrial growth society. Contrary to 
the utopian tone of the WCS, I think that the 
premises upon which it rests are flawed, and 
as such give us good reason to locate this 
document in a dystopian tradition of thought, 
a tradition which has shown itself to be in-
tolerant of nature. 
The aim of the WCS is to help advance 
the achievement of development through the 
conservation of living resources. The Strategy 
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explains the contribution of living 
resource conservation to human survival 
and to sustainable development; 
identifies the priority conservation issues 
and the main requirements for dealing 
with them; 
proposes effective ways for achieving the 
Strategy's aim.2 
Its three main objectives are: 
I) to maintain essential ecological processes 
and life-support systems (such as soil 
regeneration and protection, the recycling 
of nutrients, and the cleansing of waters) 
on which human survival and 
development depend; 
2) to preserve genetic diversity (the range 
of genetic material found in the world's 
organisms) on which depend the func-
tioning of many of the above processes 
and life-support systems, the breeding 
programmes necessary for the protection 
and improvement of cultivated plants, 
domesticated animals and micro-or-
ganisms, as well as many scientific and 
medical advances, technical innovations 
and the security of the many industries 
that use living resources; 
3) to ensure the sustainable utilization of 
species and ecosystems (notably fish and 
other wildlife, forests and grazing lands) 
which support millions of rural commun-
ities as well as major industries.3 
These, however, were only its overall 
aims. Its specific goals and their justification 
were more fully delineated along six lines: 
1) development, the modification of the 
biosphere, should be undertaken to 
"satisfy human needs and improve the 
qua)jty of human life" (sec. 1.3). 
2) conservation, the management of the 
biosphere, must "yield the greatest sus-
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tainable benefit to present and future 
generations," must be "positive, embracing 
preservation, maintenance, sustainable 
utilization, restoration and enhancement 
of the natural environment" (sec. 1.4). 
3) the preservation of genetic materials 
entails "the protection and improvement 
of cultivated plants and domesticated 
animals" for scientific advance, technical 
innovation, and the security of industry 
(sec. 1. 7). 
4) since much of the planet will be trans-
formed, such alterations must achieve the 
social and economic objectives of develop-
ment (sec 1.7). 
5) "where agriculture can supply more food, 
more economically and on a sustainable 
basis, than can the utilization of wildlife, 
the conversion of wildlife habitat to 
farmland is rational" (sec. 7.7). 
6) for "global solidarity," a new "economic 
order [must be] achieved, a new environ-
mental ethic [must be] adopted, human 
populations [must] stabilize and sustainable 
modes of development [must] become the 
rule rather than the exception" if we are 
to prevent further environmental 
deterioration (sec. 1.12). 4 
As it stands, the WCS seems to be very 
reasonable and common-sensical. How else can 
we proceed? Human life will be improved and 
benefited, and nature will be conserved. 
Throughout, the WCS is written in a tone that 
suggests that it is beyond being impugned, that 
its tenets demand an adherence that is morally 
obligatory. On the surface it appears to allay 
even the objections of those who decry a 
managerial approach to nature. After all, the 
Strategy appears to advocate solutions that are 
positive and embracing, solutions which seem 
to speak on behalf of nature. According to the 
stated goals of the WCS, however, the economic 
goals of industry will take precedence over the 
preservation of nature. This is evidenced by the 
status that agriculture is accorded by the 
"rational conversion of wildUfe habitat to 
farmland," and by the reduction of domesticated 
species to "genetic information." What is more, 
with the acceptance and implementation of the 
WCS, it is reasoned that a new environmental 
ethic will be adopted, that human populations 
will stabilize, and that all humans will benefit 
from the new economic order that would result 
from a stabilized population and the adoption 
of an environmental ethic. However, to achieve 
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such an economic order we need global 
solidarity. As the WCS states in section 16.11, 
the only problem facing the strategy is "not one 
of not knowing what to do, but of getting 
agreed action done." Shortly after the WCS was 
published, people who examined the document 
began to wonder what the WCS was really 
trying to say. It became clear to readers who 
are defenders of wild Nature that the main 
problem facing the strategy was not one of 
"getting agreed action done." What came under 
attack was the WCS's underlying assumption 
that it offers the solution to all environmental 
problems by its definitions of "environmental" 
and "problem." 
Clearly there are at least two problems 
which advocates of the protection of non-human 
phenomena felt were not sufficiently addressed 
by the WCS. The WCS never sets forth a clear 
argument for the use of Nature to feed a 
growing human population. Since an 
exponentially growing human population would 
necessitate t he resource development of natural 
areas, and protection of such areas would, 
consequently, become virtually impossible, we 
have to wonder why the WCS only makes brief 
mention of the need for human populations to 
stabilize. Preservationists also argue that the 
non-quantifiable and non-economic values which 
they attribute to nature are given insufficient 
treatment in the document. The WCS concludes 
that wildlife has only "symbolic, ritual or 
cultural importance" (sec. 4.9). 
What is perhaps most significant, though, 
is the underlying worldview of the WCS which 
such omissions illuminate. It is clear that the 
WCS assumes that salvation lies in i ncreased 
productivity, and that conservation is not an 
attitude or an activity but the centre of author-
ity, the ground of ethical obedience. (Notice 
that throughout, strategies are to be adopted 
because conservation demands "X"; moral respon-
sibility lies not in the individual but in obedi-
ence to the development ethic, and grounds for 
accepting or rejecting this authority are never 
set for in premises. Conservation/development 
is given a strange independent, transcendent 
status.) The WCS also assumes that development 
is a global necessity, that science and technology 
can solve any environmental problem, and that 
the status quo must be maintained. The bottom-
line is that it assumes global utility and insists 
on global unity, universal acceptance and 
application of the industrial growth ethos and 
the conservation/development imperative. We 
notice, however, that because the WCS takes 
their assumptions to be obvious and insists on 
objectives that arc taken for granted, the 
worldview the Strategy espouses is never clearly 
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set forth. We now turn our attention to see how 
these assumptions, objectives and western bias 
came to be obvious or taken for granted. 
The purpose of the remainder of this paper 
is to sketch the historical root of the 
commodification of nature in Western culture 
and to illuminate how the WCS embraces and 
perpetuates this ideology. The intended product 
is to show how the utopian speculation in much 
of Western philosophy has lead toward a 
dystopian relationship with nature once it has 
been put into practice. 
The World Conservation Strategy did not 
spring out of a vacuum. Its nature-intolerant 
cosmology has been around in some form 
seemingly forever. Many authors5 have claimed 
that Western society's relation to nature was 
pe rverted in the original Judeo-Christian notion 
of Genesis which gave us the first concrete 
statement of our separation from nature: 
Be fruitful and multiply and replenish 
the earth and subdue it; and hare 
dominion over the fish of the sea,and 
over the fowl of the air, and over every 
living thing that moveth upon the earth. 
(Genesis 1 :28) 
Very early then, it seems that we have a 
recipe for planetary management. Humans, 
created in God's image, stand at the apex of 
creation and are custodians of God's power on 
earth. There is a problem of interpretation, 
however, with this role. In one view human 
beings may be seen as stewa rds who must act 
responsibly towards that w h ich they have 
proprietary rights over. In another view, the 
concepts of power and subdual seem to act as 
imperatives compelling humans to adopt certain 
attitudes and realize certain courses of action. 
In neither case, however, is the absolute 
dominion over nature questioned. Viewed as 
despot or responsible steward, humanity, in 
either interpretation, has f ull rights to do what 
it wants with its natural resources. 
Clearly the human/nature schism has been 
around a long time. It was certainly in place 
when Plato began to ruminate about humanity's 
role on earth and the ~erfectly just state: 
Utopia. In The Republic Plato attempted to 
give humanity, now thoroughly removed from 
nature conceptually, a notion of ho w the 
perfect ly just state, predicated on reason, might 
work. Human beings, supposedly freed from 
any ecological system, required a rational, 
artific ial system to regulate and structure their 
actions in relation to one another. What 
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subsequent generations inherited from Plato was 
the explicit argument that no system could be 
considered utopian unless it fully stressed 
harmony, order and stability, and reason above 
any emotional or physical concerns. 
Even though Plato set the precedent for 
a Utopia grounded in the separation of hu-
manity and nature, reason and emotion, he was 
no despot over nature. The identification of 
Utopia with the despotic treatment of the non-
human arose some twenty centuries after Plato 
with the advent of scientific inquiry. Francis 
Bacon in particular, viewed science as the 
handmaiden of Utopia. He declared that by 
means of science, humanity was in a position 
to not only have knowledge of nature's secrets, 
but also to master it. Not one to mince words, 
Bacon declared that "natural science therefore 
has no other goal than to more firmly establish 
and extend the power and domination of 
humanity over nature." 7 Bacon, like Rene 
Descartes, clearly voiced the basic values, 
beliefs and assumptions of humanism predicated 
on Plato's dualism and emphasis on reason.8 He 
steadfastly maintained though, in contrast to 
Plato, that power, control and subdual must 
direct our perceptions, decisions and actions if 
we take reason to be the means by which to 
establish Utopia. He viewed natural objects 
with contempt for they represented the an -
tithesis of reason. They were impediments that 
had to be overcome. In order to realize Utopia 
we had to rid ourselves of anything non-
rational. Freedom lay in the emancipation from 
determined bodily responses, from biological 
constraints. 
Though there were other interpretations 
of humanity's role on earth, humanistic specu-
lation shared some common f ea tu res. It was 
assumed that in knowledge of Nature and the 
self all humans could be liberated from super-
stitious and false doctrines and made socially 
equal through advances in science. For humans 
to realize their utopian ideals, they had to exist 
in a thoroughly rational, human-centered 
universe. Emotion, being antagoniStiC to 
Reason, had to be expunged from human nature. 
These attributes -- the control of Nature, the 
control of self, faith in human abilities and a 
belittling of the physical and the natural-- were 
endorsed under the new set of beliefs, 
assumptions and values that became a major 
strain of humanism. By the sixteenth century 
human interests and values were given a 
completely superordinate pos ition with regards 
to the interests of non-human nature. Within 
humanism utopian thinkers asserted the dignity 
and worth of humans and their capacity to 
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achieve self-realization through the use of 
Reason and the scientific method. 
Humanistic conceptions of Utopia took on 
a new dimension with the union of science and 
technology. The union of scientific research, 
technological innovation and industrial mass-
production allowed Nature to be productively 
managed and "harvested." Once machines made 
it possible to suit our own ends, the utopian 
ideal of all humans being equal materially, if 
not soCially, seemed to be at hand. In hindsight 
we know this did . not occur. The reason 
equality did not occur is because there are 
implicit contradictions in the humanistic, 
rational conception of Utopia that thwa rt its 
realization. 
Bacon's rationalism and dualism allowed 
him to view the utopian state like the 
mind/body dualism. Just as the mind must rule 
the body so in Utopia the rulers must govern 
the people. However, if humanism believes a 
goal of Utopia is the social equality of the 
people, where is social equality in a state that 
emphasizes rulers and subjects, the governors 
and the governed? Reason dictates the'subject/-
object split between the rulers and the ruled in 
Utopia. Hence, as long as we stress rationalism 
and dualism as necessary conditions of Utopia, 
we cannot establish the perfect state, a state 
with social equality. Since, on the one hand, a 
major strain of humanism asserts the essential 
dignity and equality of humans, and 
rationalism, on the other hand, dictates a 
subject-object relation in Utopia, there is a 
contradiction between the egalitarian ideal of 
the former and the necessarily elitist view of 
the latter. The very ideals of humanism, when 
united with rationalist imperatives, form a 
contradiction that makes the realization of those 
selfsame ideals impossible. One cannot have a 
social structure that is at once egalitarian and 
elitist. Thus most critics of rationalism agree 
that humanistic ideals tend to be rejected in 
favour of a reasonable, functionally efficient 
Utopia. Consequently, the formal structure of 
Utopia tends to supplant the human content. 
Therefore when Utopia is taken to its logical 
extreme, Dystopia is the inevitable result. 
Utopia becomes Dystopia in a particularly 
evident way in two twentieth century novels, 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World9 and George 
Orwell's 198410. Rather than demonstrating this 
trend theoretically, both authors set out to 
portray a completely rational, ordered Utopia . 
The novels are horrifying because they express 
the logical conclusion of Platonic and 
humanistic values. Themes basic to both works 
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grow out of Utopian beliefs such as freedom 
through reason, the denial of the emotions, the 
denial of the self, the mastery of Nature 
(including human Nature -- genetically and 
conceptually), the sense of power entailed in the 
subject/object split, the dignity of humans, the 
desire for social equality, the need for 
systemization and the need for standardization. 
Huxley and Orwell conclude that such notions 
when solely rationally-based are, if not blatant-
ly chimerical or self -contradictory, then deci-
dedly inhuman. They show in their fiction that 
reason, as the sole organizing principle of 
Utopia, debases humans by stripping them of 
their dignity and individuality. In order to 
maximize social utility, people are reduced to 
the status of objects useful to the state. In 
Brave New World we see the individual defined 
solely in terms of concepts such as "progress,"11 
"improvement "12 "wasted "13 "gratuitous "14 and 
' , ' 
the list goes on. All human elements, such as 
freedom, self -expression, and spontaneity, are 
superceded by the person's functional role in the 
state. In such a state, each person must fulfill 
his/her appointed task without thought of 
freedom or equality (in 1984 Orwell achieves 
this by making the concepts of freedom and 
slavery tautological). Such concepts are 
dangerous because they are inefficient. As 
Huxley points out, the worst that can be said of 
such a state is that it is inefficient rather than 
inhuman. In Utopia humans lose those things 
that make them human (emotions and the desire 
to create), and become slaves to their own 
creation. Furthermore, because humans have 
no access to history in Utopia (that is, to the 
roots of their beliefs and concepts) they have 
no idea who they are. Not knowing who they 
are or what they want, freedom and equality 
cease to be their goals. 
What Orwell and Huxley attempted to 
show in their texts was that the very human 
attitude that commodifies Nature, that turns it 
into a source of resources for the attainment 
of human goals, turns in on itself and com-
modifies humans. In denying human physical 
existence, human emotions and human individ-
uality in the hope that their rationality will 
liberate them and make them equal with others 
(as the Platonic-humanist tradition assumes) 
humans lose their essence, their intrinsic worth. 
1984 was published in 1949, the WCS in 
1980. The authors of the WCS should have 
known that dualistic and humanist utopian 
speculation merged with science and technology 
and taken to its logical extreme, yields Dystopia. 
As I see it, the WCS is the apotheosis of 
dystopian irrationality and inhumanity. The 
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WCS ignores Huxley's and Orwell's call to 
examine history and to trace the roots of our 
assumptions. The central flaw of the WCS is 
that the authors utterly ignore the past. Perhaps 
this is because the past is threatening since it 
indicates the cultural relativity of ideas, and 
the possibility of alternate images, inter-
pretations and values. An awareness of the past 
carries with it a demand to provide the basis or 
justification for our goals and assumptions. The 
past is, in some sense, our conscience. It is the 
enemy of dogmatic pronouncements and 
ideologies. It judges our institutions and makes 
us uneasy about our self-justifications and 
rationalizations. Perhaps, more than anything 
else, it challenges our belief in "necessary" 
activity and "absolute" truth. The only way to 
make us feel better is therefore to forget the 
past. In this way we can deem our activity 
right, appropriate and necessary, and our 
decisions and objectives valid. It seems to me 
that, above all else, the WCS is an a void a nee of 
the past. 
In ignoring history it is easier for the WCS 
to claim that it is rational and it is also easier 
to justify a strategy which would otherwise 
appear to be a confusing, if not contradictory, 
set of recommendations, suggestions and 
objectives. By ignoring history, the WCS finds 
it is easy to equate Reason very narrowly with 
efficiency, productivity and utility and to 
overlook its much broader base of curiosity, 
humility and wonder. The WCS assumes the 
Platonic division of reason and emotion is an 
absolute truth. It debases reason by identifying 
rationality with expediency. Reason, in the 
WCS, becomes rationalization, a cynical 
justification for behaviour that acts without 
reflection. Every page of the WCS carries 
objectives that arc justified because they 
improve and enhance, are efficient or useful. 
Where, though, arc the anticipated criticisms 
that force definitions and arguments? Why does 
Nature require improvement and enhancement? 
Should non-human nature be red uced to useful 
commodities for us? Should appropriate 
behaviour be defined simply in terms of 
efficiency? 
In 1984 Orwell made it clear that, in order 
for the stable, efficient and rational Utopia 
predicated on power, control and subdual to 
work, it must invent the past. It must be 
completely standardized/system-
atized/homogenized and must have the complete 
obedience of the members of the state. To 
achieve its ends, the perfect state must destroy 
individuality. Individuality presupposes ques-
tioning and self-expression, characteristics that 
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undermine authority. To protect its sovereign-
ty the state must ensure individuals view 
themselves solely in terms of their efficient 
functioning. This is most easily realized 
through genetic engineering and through the 
destruction of language, in other words, the 
elimination of real dichotomies. By making 
dualistic concepts tautological (that is, self-
contained, self -perpetuating and self-justified) 
the state ensures that the individual cannot 
think or question. In controlling the individ-
ual, both biologically and conceptually, the state 
ensures that its objectives are realized, and its 
commands are obeyed. 
What if we view the WCS as a utopian 
vision? The WCS's perfect world is modelled 
on the Pia tonic and humanistic Utopia of order, 
efficiency and Reason. Its insistence on the 
need for global solidarity entails the complete 
standardization and homogenization of 
worldviews. There is no room for unique 
cultural conceptions of conservation. Idiosyn- . 
cratic conceptions and behaviour undermine the 
industrial growth ethos. As I said at the 
beginning, the security of industries employing 
living resources is specifically mentioned in two 
of the three central aims of the Strategy. 
Control through genetic engineering is also a 
given, though not yet for the human species. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of the 
WCS's dystopian vision is its equating of 
conservation with development. Historically, 
naturalists, among others, have regarded these 
concepts as polar opposites. By making these 
concepts tautological the WCS clearly exhibits 
the role it believes it plays, as the ultimate 
authority on planetary management. It won't 
tolerate opposition and its mandate requires no 
justification. By pre-empting individual 
questioning (tautologies arc necessarily true) 
it hopes to convince the reader that its pro-
nouncements and objectives are unquestionably 
necessary. Every strategy is seen to be logically 
entailed by the i nitial tautology. Definitions 
are to be seen as superfluous, unnecessary. As 
in 1984, obedience is ensured by making thought 
and questioning impossible. The destruction of 
language a nd the violation of the rules of 
rationality, permits the WCS to be self-
justi fying. The Strategy's conclusion that 
opposition to the strategy "is not one of not 
knowing what to do, but of getting agreed 
action do ne" really does cease to be a problem 
once .informed dissent is disallowed and once 
conceptual flexibility is lost. Having dissolved 
the distinction between conservation and 
development, the WCS assures the fulfillment 
of its utopian objectives. With the demise of 
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critical acuity the WCS can effect the world-
wide acceptance of its resourcist bias, of the 
industrial growth ethos and the conser-
vation/development imperative. The utopian 
goal of global solidarity can be achieved 
through a standardization of beliefs and values. 
The WCS embraces Plato's dualism and 
hierarchy of values/virtues, Bacon's notions of 
control and power, and the humanistic ideal of 
liberty and salvation achieved through science 
and technology. At the same time the Strategy 
seeks to make Reason the sole organizing 
principle of Utopia. It thus overlooks the 
implicit social contradictions entailed by the 
realization of a completely rational system and 
the implicit contradictions for the preservation 
of wild non-human Nature. In short it fails to 
see the Orwellian ramifications of its tunnel-
vision. The following ingredients of the WCS's 
worldview indicate, I think, a dystopian vision: 
I) it assumes utility I efficiency and prod uc-
tivity; 
2) it assumes improvement and enhancement; 
3) it assumes global economic solidarity; 
4) it assumes unquestioned obedience to the 
conservation/ development imperative; 
5) there is a lack of definitions, and reasoned 
arguments; 
6) there is no sense of history, of the 
possibility of revising images and values; 
7) the language is tautological; 
8) it assumes genetic engineering is positive; 
9) it disregards individuality; 
10) it assumes systemization/ standardization/ -
homogeniza tion; 
11) it assumes domination and control; 
12) it over-emphasises Reason; 
13) it has complete faith in technology and 
management; 
1 4) it provides its own self- justification. 
That these ingredients mirror those of 
1984, and that 1984 is seen as completely 
inhumane and cruel suggests to me that some-
thing very dangerous has happened to our 
thinking. I think that the almost universal 
acceptance of the WCS is cause for alarm. 
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